ONE

The Anaximander Fragment

It is considered the oldest fragment of Western thinking. Anaximander reportedly lived on the island of Samos from the end of the seventh century to the middle of the sixth.

According to the generally accepted text the fragment reads:

ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι καὶ τὴν φθορὰν εἰς ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν.

Whence things have their origin, there they must also pass away according to necessity; for they must pay penalty and be judged for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time.

Thus translates the young Nietzsche in a treatise completed in 1873 entitled *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks.* The treatise was published posthumously in 1903, thirty years after its composition. It is based on a lecture course Nietzsche offered several times in the early 1870's at Basel under the title, "The Preplatonic Philosophers, with Interpretation of Selected Fragments."

In the same year, 1903, that Nietzsche's essay on the Preplatonic philosophers first became known, Hermann Diels' *Fragments of the Presocratics* appeared. It contained texts critically selected according to the methods of modern classical philology, along with a translation. The work is dedicated to Wilhelm Dilthey. Diels translates the Anaximander fragment in the following words:

But where things have their origin, there too their passing away occurs according to necessity; for they pay recompense and penalty to one another for their recklessness, according to firmly established time.

The translations by Nietzsche and Diels arise from different intentions and procedures. Nevertheless they are scarcely distinguishable. In many ways Diels' translation is more literal. But when a translation is only literal it is not necessarily faithful. It is faithful only when its terms are words which speak from the language of the matter itself.

More important than the general agreement of the two translations is the conception of Anaximander which underlies both. Nietzsche locates him among the Preplatonic philosophers, Diels among the Presocratics. The two designations are alike. The unexpressed standard for considering and judging the early thinkers is the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. These are taken as the Greek philosophers who set the standard both before and after themselves. Traversing Christian theology, this view becomes firmly entrenched as a universal conviction, one which to this day has not been shaken. In the meantime, even when philological and historical research treat philosophers before Plato and Aristotle in greater detail, Platonic and Aristotelian representations and concepts, in modern transformations, still guide the interpretation. That is also the case when attempts are made to locate what is archaic in early thinking by finding parallels in classical archaeology and literature. Classic and classicist representations prevail. We expatiate on archaic logic, not realizing that logic occurs for the first time in the curriculum of the Platonic and Aristotelian schools.

Simply ignoring these later notions will not help in the course of translating from one language to another, if we do not first of all see how it stands with the matter to be translated. But the matter here is a matter for thinking. Granted our concern for philologically enlightened language, we must in translating first of all think about the matter involved. Therefore only thinkers can help us in our attempt to translate the fragment of this early thinker. When we cast about for such help we surely seek in vain.

In his own way the young Nietzsche does establish a vibrant rapport with the personalities of the Preplatonic philosophers; but his interpretations of the texts are commonplace, if not entirely superficial, throughout. Hegel is the only Western thinker who has thoughtfully experienced the history of thought; yet he says nothing about the

Anaximander fragment. Furthermore, Hegel too shares the predominant conviction concerning the classic character of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. He provides the basis for the classification of the early thinkers as Preplatonic and Presocratic precisely by grasping them as Pre-Aristotelians.

In his lectures on the history of Greek philosophy, at the point where he indicates the sources for our knowledge of this primeval epoch of philosophy, Hegel says the following:

> Aristotle is the richest source. He studied the older philosophers expressly and with attention to fundamentals. Especially at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* (though in many other places besides) he spoke as a historian about the entire group of them. He is as philosophical as he is learned; we can depend on him. For Greek philosophy we can do nothing better than take up the first book of his *Metaphysics*. (*Works*, XIII, 189)

What Hegel recommends here to his listeners in the first decades of the nineteenth century had already been followed by Theophrastus, Aristotle's contemporary, his student, and the first successor to the leadership of the Peripatetics. Theophrastus died about 286 B.C. He composed a text with the title Φυσικῶν δόξαι, "the opinions of those who speak of φύσει ὄντα." Aristotle also calls them the φυσιολόγοι, meaning the early thinkers who ponder the things of nature. Φύσις means sky and earth, plants and animals, and also in a certain way men. The word designates a special region of beings which, in both Aristotle and the Platonic school, are separated from ἦθος and λόγος. For them φύσις no longer has the broad sense of the totality of being. At the outset of Aristotle's thematic observations on *Physics*, that is, on the ontology of the φύσει ὄντα, the kind of being called φύσει ὄντα is contrasted with that of τέχνῃ ὄντα, Φύσει ὄντα is that which produces itself by arising out of itself; τέχνῃ ὄντα is produced by human planning and production.

When Hegel says of Aristotle that he is "as philosophical as he is learned," this actually means that Aristotle regards the early thinkers in the historical perspective, and according to the standard, of his own *Physics*. For us that means: Hegel understands the Preplatonic and Presocratic philosophers as Pre-Aristotelians. After Hegel a twofold opinion concerning philosophy before Plato and Aristotle ensconces

itself as the general view: (1) the early thinkers, in search of the first beginnings of being, for the most part took nature as the object of their representations; (2) their utterances on nature are inadequate approximations compared to the knowledge of nature which in the meantime had blossomed in the Platonic and Aristotelian schools, the Stoa, and the schools of medicine.

The Φυσικῶν δόξαι of Theophrastus became the chief source for manuals of the history of philosophy in Hellenistic times. These manuals prescribed the interpretation of the original writings of the early thinkers which may have survived to that time, and founded the subsequent doxographical tradition in philosophy. Not only the content but also the style of this tradition made its mark on the relation of later thinkers—even beyond Hegel—to the history of thought.

About 530 A.D. the Neoplatonist Simplicius wrote an extensive commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*. In it he reproduced the Anaximander fragment, thus preserving it for the Western world. He copied the fragment from Theophrastus' Φυσικῶν δόξαι. From the time Anaximander pronounced his saying—we do not know where or when or to whom—to the moment Simplicius jotted it down in his commentary more than a millennium elapsed. Between the time of Simplicius' jotting and the present moment lies another millennium-and-a-half.

Can the Anaximander fragment, from a historical and chronological distance of two thousand five hundred years, still say something to us? By what authority should it speak? Only because it is the oldest? In themselves the ancient and antiquarian have no weight. Besides, although the fragment is the oldest vouchsafed to us by our tradition we do not know whether it is the earliest fragment of its kind in Western thinking. We may presume so, provided we first of all think the essence of the West in terms of what the early saying says.

But what entitles antiquity to address us, presumably the latest latecomers with respect to philosophy? Are we latecomers in a history now racing towards its end, an end which in its increasingly sterile order of uniformity brings everything to an end? Or does there lie concealed in the historical and chronological remoteness of the fragment the historic proximity of something unsaid, something that will speak out in times to come?

Do we stand in the very twilight of the most monstrous transformation our planet has ever undergone, the twilight of that epoch in which earth itself hangs suspended? Do we confront the evening of a night which heralds another dawn? Are we to strike off on a journey to this historic region of earth's evening? Is the land of evening* only now emerging? Will this land of evening overwhelm Occident and Orient alike, transcending whatever is merely European to become the location of a new but primordially fated history? Are we men of today already "Western" in a sense that first crystallizes in the course of our passage into the world's night? What can all merely historiological philosophies of history tell us about our history if they only dazzle us with surveys of its sedimented stuff; if they explain history without ever thinking out, from the essence of history, the fundamentals of their way of explaining events, and the essence of history, in turn, from Being itself? *Are* we the latecomers we are? But are we also at the same time precursors of the dawn of an altogether different age, which has already left our contemporary historiological representations of history behind?

Nietzsche, from whose philosophy (all too coarsely understood) Spengler predicted the decline of theWest—in the sense of the Western historical world—writes in "The Wanderer and His Shadow" (1880), "A higher situation for mankind is possible, in which the Europe of nations will be obscured and forgotten, but in which Europe will *live on* in thirty very ancient but never antiquated books" (Aphorism no. 125).

All historiography predicts what is to come from images of the past determined by the present. It systematically destroys the future and our historic relation to the advent of destiny. Historicism has today not only not been overcome, but is only now entering the stage of its expansion and entrenchment. The technical organization of communications throughout the world by radio and by a press already limping after it is the genuine form of historicism's dominion.

Can we nevertheless portray and represent the dawn of an age in ways different from those of historiography? Perhaps the discipline of

**Land des Abends, Abend-land.* In German *Abendland* means Occident, or "the West," literally "the evening-land."—TR.

history is still for us an indispensable tool for making the historical contemporary. That does not in any way mean however that historiography, taken by itself, enables us to form within our history a truly adequate, far-reaching relation to history.

The antiquity pervading the Anaximander fragment belongs to the dawn of early times in the land of evening. But what if that which is early outdistanced everything late; if the very earliest far surpassed the very latest? What once occurred in the dawn of our destiny would then come, as what once occurred, at the last (ἔσχατον), that is, at the departure of the long-hidden destiny of Being. The Being of beings is gathered (λέγεσθαι, λόγος) in the ultimacy of its destiny. The essence of Being hitherto disappears, its truth still veiled. The history of Being is gathered in this departure. The gathering in this departure, as the gathering (λόγος) at the outermost point (ἔσχατον) of its essence hitherto, is the eschatology of Being. As something fateful, Being itself is inherently eschatological.

However, in the phrase "eschatology of Being" we do not understand the term "eschatology" as the name of a theological or philosophical discipline. We think of the eschatology of Being in a way corresponding to the way the phenomenology of spirit is to be thought, i.e. from within the history of Being. The phenomenology of spirit itself constitutes a phase in the eschatology of Being, when Being gathers itself in the ultimacy of its essence, hitherto determined through metaphysics, as the absolute subjecticity [*Subjektität*] of the unconditioned will to will.

If we think within the eschatology of Being, then we must someday anticipate the former dawn in the dawn to come; today we must learn to ponder this former dawn through what is imminent.

If only once we could hear the fragment it would no longer sound like an assertion historically long past. Nor would we be seduced by vain hopes of calculating historically, i.e. philologically and psychologically, what was at one time really present to that man called Anaximander of Miletus which may have served as the condition for his way of representing the world. But presuming we do hear what his saying says, what binds us in our attempt to translate it? How do we get to

what is said in the saying, so that it might rescue the translation from arbitrariness?

We are bound to the language of the saying. We are bound to our mother tongue. In both cases we are essentially bound to language and to the experience of its essence. This bond is broader and stronger, but far less apparent, than the standards of all philological and historical facts—which can only borrow their factuality from it. So long as we do not experience this binding, every translation of the fragment must seem wholly arbitrary. Yet even when we are bound to what is said in the saying, not only the translation but also the binding retain the appearance of violence, as though what is to be heard and said here necessarily suffers violence.

Only in thoughtful dialogue with what it says can this fragment of thinking be translated. However, thinking is poetizing, and indeed more than one kind of poetizing, more than poetry and song. Thinking of Being is the original way of poetizing. Language first comes to language, i.e. into its essence, in thinking. Thinking says what the truth of Being dictates; it is the original *dictare*. Thinking is primordial poetry, prior to all poesy, but also prior to the poetics of art, since art shapes its work within the realm of language. All poetizing, in this broader sense, and also in the narrower sense of the poetic, is in its ground a thinking. The poetizing essence of thinking preserves the sway of the truth of Being. Because it poetizes as it thinks, the translation which wishes to let the oldest fragment of thinking itself speak necessarily appears violent.

We shall try to translate the Anaximander fragment. This requires that we translate what is said in Greek into our German tongue. To that end our thinking must first, before translating, be translated to what is said in Greek. Thoughtful translation to what comes to speech in this fragment is a leap over an abyss [*Graben*]. The abyss does not consist merely of the chronological or historical distance of two-and-a-half millennia. It is wider and deeper. It is hard to leap, mainly because we stand right on its edge. We are so near the abyss that we do not have an adequate runway for such a broad jump; we easily fall short—if indeed the lack of a sufficiently solid base allows any leap at all.

What comes to language in the fragment? The question is ambiguous and therefore imprecise. It might mean to inquire into the matter the fragment says something about; it might also mean what the fragment says in itself. More literally translated the fragment says:

But that from which things arise also gives rise to their passing away, according to what is necessary; for things render justice and pay penalty to one another for their injustice, according to the ordinance of time.

According to the usual view the statement speaks of the origin and decay of things. It specifies the nature of this process. Originating and decaying refer back to the place whence they come. Things flower, things fall. Thus they exhibit a kind of barter system in Nature's immutable economy. The exchange of constructive and destructive moments is, of course, only roughly grasped as a general characteristic of natural occurrences. The mutability of all things is therefore not yet represented with precision in terms of motions defined by exact relations of mass. At this point an appropriate formula of the laws of motion is still lacking. The judgment of later, more progressive times is indulgent enough not to ridicule this primitive natural science. Indeed it is found altogether fitting that incipient observation of nature should describe the processes of things in terms of common occurrences in the human sphere. This is why Anaximander's statement mentions justice and injustice, recompense and penalty, sin and retribution, with respect to things. Moral and juridical notions get mixed in with his view of nature. In this regard Theophrastus already criticizes Anaximander for ποιητικωτέροις οὕτως ὀνόμασιν αὐτὰ λέγων, that is, for employing rather poetic words for what he wants to say. Theophrastus means the words δίκη, τίσις, ἀδικία, διδόναι δίκην. . . .

Before all else we should try to make out what the fragment speaks of. Only then can we judge what it says concerning its subject matter.

Considered grammatically, the fragment consists of two clauses. The first begins: ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι τοῖς οὖσι. . . . The matter under discussion is ὄντα; translated literally, τὰ ὄντα means "beings." The neuter plural appears as τὰ πολλά, "the many," in the sense of the manifold of being. But τὰ ὄντα does not mean an arbitrary or boundless multiplicity; rather, it means τὰ πάντα, the totality of being. Thus τὰ

ὄντα means manifold being in totality. The second clause begins: διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ. . . . The αὐτά refers to the τοῖς ὀυοι of the first clause.

The fragment speaks of manifold being in totality. But not only things belong among beings. In the fullest sense, "things" are not only things of nature. Man, things produced by man, and the situation or environment effected and realized by the deeds and omissions of men, also belong among beings, and so do daimonic and divine things. All these are not merely "also" in being; they are even more in being than mere things. The Aristotelian-Theophrastian presupposition that τὰ ὄντα must be φύσει ὄντα, natural things in the narrower sense, is altogether groundless. It is superfluous for our translation. But even the translation of τὰ ὄντα as "the things" does not suit the matter which comes to language in the saying.

If the presupposition that the fragment makes statements about things of nature fails, however, then so does all foundation for the assertion that what ought to be represented strictly in terms of the natural sciences is interpreted morally and juridically. With the collapse of the presupposition that the fragment strives after scientific knowledge concerning the demarcated realm of nature, another assumption becomes superfluous, namely, that at this time ethical or juridical matters were interpreted in terms of the disciplines we call "ethics" and "jurisprudence." Denial of such boundaries between disciplines does not mean to imply that in early times law and ethicality were unknown. But if the way we normally think within a range of disciplines (such as physics, ethics, philosophy of law, biology, psychology) has no place here—if boundaries between these subjects are lacking—then there is no possibility of trespass or of the unjustified transfer of notions from one area to another. Yet where boundaries between disciplines do not appear, boundless indeterminacy and flux do not necessarily prevail: on the contrary, an appropriate articulation of a matter purely thought may well come to language when it has been freed from every oversimplification.

The words δίκη, ἀδικία, and τίσις have a broad significance which cannot be enclosed within the boundaries of particular disciplines. "Broad" does not mean here extensive, in the sense of something

flattened or thinned out, but rather far-reaching, rich, containing much thought. For precisely that reason these words are employed: to bring to language the manifold totality in its essential unity. For that to happen, of course, thinking must apprehend the unified totality of the manifold, with its peculiar characteristics, purely in its own terms.

This way of letting manifold being in its unity come into essential view is anything but a kind of primitive and anthropomorphic representation.

In order to translate at all what comes to language in the fragment, we must, before we do any actual translating, consciously cast aside all inadequate presuppositions. For example, that the fragment pertains to the philosophy of nature—in such a way that inappropriate moralisms and legalisms are enmeshed in it; or that highly specialized ideas relevant to particular regions of nature, ethics, or law play a role in it; or finally, that a primitive outlook still prevails which examines the world uncritically, interprets it anthropomorphically, and therefore resorts to poetic expressions.

However, even to cast aside all presuppositions whenever we find them inadequate is insufficient so long as we fail to gain access to what comes to language in the fragment. Dialogue with early Greek thinking will be fruitful only when such listening occurs. It is proper to dialogue that its conversation speak of the same thing; indeed, that it speak out of participation in the Same. According to its wording, the fragment speaks of ὄντα, expressing what they involve and how it is with them. Beings are spoken of in such a way that their Being is expressed. Being comes to language as the Being of beings.

At the summit of the completion of Western philosophy these words are pronounced: "To *stamp* Becoming with the character of Being—that is the *highest will to power*." Thus writes Nietzsche in a note entitled, "Recapitulation." According to the character of the manuscript's handwriting we must locate it in the year 1885, about the time when Nietzsche, having completed *Zarathustra*, was planning his systematic metaphysical *magnum opus*. The "Being" Nietzsche thinks here is "the eternal recurrence of the same." It is the way of continuance through which will to power wills itself and guarantees its own presencing as the Being of Becoming. At the outermost point of the

completion of metaphysics the Being of beings is addressed in these words.

The ancient fragment of early Western thinking and the late fragment of recent Western thinking bring the Same to language, but what they say is not identical. However, where we can speak of the Same in terms of things which are not identical, the fundamental condition of a thoughtful dialogue between recent and early times is automatically fulfilled.

Or does it only seem so? Does there lie behind this "seeming" a gap between the language of our thinking and the language of Greek philosophy? Whatever the case, if we take τὰ ὄντα to mean "beings" and εἶναι as nothing else than "to be," we cross every gap; granting the differences between these epochs, we are together with the early thinkers in the realm of the Same. This Same secures our translation of τὰ ὄντα and εἶναι by "beings" and "to be." Must we place in evidence extensive texts of Greek philosophy in order to demonstrate the unimpeachable correctness of this translation? All interpretations of Greek philosophy themselves already rest on this translation. Every lexicon provides the most copious information concerning these words, εἶναι meaning "to be," ἔστιν "is," ὄν "being," and τὰ ὄντα "beings."

So it is in fact. We do not mean to express doubts about it. We do not ask whether ὄν is correctly translated as "being" and εἶναι as "to be"; we ask only whether in this correct translation we also think correctly. We ask only whether in this most common of all translations anything at all is thought.

Let us see. Let us examine ourselves and others. It becomes manifest that in this correct translation everything is embroiled in equivocal and imprecise significations. It becomes clear that the always hasty approximations of usual translations are never seen as insufficient; nor are scholarly research and writing ever disturbed by them. Perhaps great effort is expended in order to bring out what the Greeks truly represented to themselves in words like θεός, ψυχή, ζωή, τύχη, χάρις, λόγος, φύσις, or words like ἰδέα, τέχνη, and ἐνέργεια. But we do not realize that these and similar labors get nowhere and come to nothing so long as they do not satisfactorily clarify that realm of all realms—so long as they do not cast sufficient light on ὄν and εἶναι in

their Greek essence. But scarcely have we named εἶναι as a realm than "realm" is represented by the logical apparatus of γένος and κοινόν, and understood in the sense of the universal and all-encompassing. This grasping together *(concipere)* in the manner of representational concepts is immediately taken to be the only possible way to understand Being. It is still taken to be applicable when one hastens into the dialectic of concepts or flees to a nonconceptual realm of mystic signs. It is wholly forgotten that the potency of the concept and the interpretation of thinking as conceiving rest solely on the unthought, because unexperienced, essence of ὄν and εἶναι.

Most often we thoughtlessly catalogue the words ὄν and εἶναι under what we mean by the corresponding (but unthought) words of our own mother tongue, "being" and "to be." More precisely, we never ascribe a significance to the Greek words at all: we immediately adopt them from our stock of common knowledge, which has already endowed them with the common intelligibility of its own language. We support the Greek words with nothing except the complacent negligence of hasty opinion. This may do in a pinch, when for example we are reading ἔιναι and ἔστιν in Thucydides' historical works, or ἦν and ἔσται in Sophocles.

But what if τὰ ὄντα, ὄν, and εἶναι come to speak in language as the fundamental words of thinking, and not simply a particular kind of thinking but rather as the key words for all Western thinking? Then an examination of the language employed in the translation would reveal the following state of affairs:

Neither is it clear and firmly established what we ourselves are thinking in the words "being" and "to be" in our own language;

nor is it clear and firmly established whether anything we are liable to come up with suits what the Greeks were addressing in the words ὄν and εἶναι.

Neither is it at all clear and firmly established what ὄν and εἶναι, thought in Greek, say;

nor can we, granted this state of affairs, administer an examination which might determine whether and how far our thinking corresponds to that of the Greeks.

These simple relations remain thoroughly confused and un-

thought. But within them, hovering over them, Being-talk has drifted far and wide, all at sea. Buoyed by the formal correctness of the translation of ὄν and εἶναι by "being" and "to be," drifting right on by the confused state of affairs, Being-talk deceives. But not only do we contemporary men err in this confusion; all the notions and representations we have inherited from Greek philosophy remain in the same confusion, exiled for millennia. Neither pure neglect on the part of philology nor inadequate historical research has occasioned this confusion. It arises from the abyss [*Abgrund*] of that relation by which Being has appropriated the essence of Western man. We cannot therefore dissolve the confusion by elaborating through some definition a more precise meaning for the words ὄν and εἶναι, "being" and "to be." On the contrary, the attempt to heed this confusion steadfastly, using its tenacious power to effect some resolution, may well bring about a situation which releases a different destiny of Being. The preparation of such an occasion is already sufficient reason to set in motion, within the abiding confusion, a conversation with early thinking.

If we so stubbornly insist on thinking Greek thought in Greek fashion it is by no means because we intend to sketch a historical portrait of Greek antiquity, as one of the past great ages of man, which would be in many respects more accurate. We search for what is Greek neither for the sake of the Greeks themselves nor for the advancement of scholarship. Nor do we desire a more meaningful conversation simply for its own sake. Rather, our sole aim is to reach what wants to come to language in such a conversation, provided it come of its own accord. And this is that Same which fatefully concerns the Greeks and ourselves, albeit in different ways. It is that which brings the dawn of thinking into the fate of things Western, into the land of evening. Only as a result of this fatefulness [*Geschick*] do the Greeks become Greeks in the historic [*geschichtlich*] sense.

In our manner of speaking, "Greek" does not designate a particular people or nation, nor a cultural or anthropological group. What is Greek is the dawn of that destiny in which Being illuminates itself in beings and so propounds a certain essence of man; that essence unfolds historically as something fateful, preserved in Being and dispensed by Being, without ever being separated from Being.

Greek antiquity, Christendom, modern times, global affairs, and

the West interpreted as the land of evening—we are thinking all these on the basis of a fundamental characteristic of Being which is more concealed in Λήθη than it is revealed in Ἀλήθεια. Yet this concealing of its essence and of its essential origin is characteristic of Being's primordial self-illumination, so much so that thinking simply does *not* pursue it. The being itself does not step into this light of Being. The unconcealment of beings, the brightness granted them, obscures the light of Being.

As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws.

In this way, by illuminating them, Being sets beings adrift in errancy. Beings come to pass in that errancy by which they circumvent Being and establish the realm of error (in the sense of a prince's realm or the realm of poetry). Error is the space in which history unfolds. In error what happens in history bypasses what is like Being. Therefore, whatever unfolds historically is necessarily misinterpreted. During the course of this misinterpretation destiny awaits what will become of its seed. It brings those whom it concerns to the possibilities of the fateful and fatal [*Geschicklichen und Ungeschicklichen*]. Man's destiny gropes toward its fate [*Geschick versucht sich an Geschick*]. Man's inability to see himself corresponds to the self-concealing of the lighting of Being.

Without errancy there would be no connection from destiny to destiny: there would be no history. Chronological distance and causal sequence do indeed belong to the discipline of historiography, but are not themselves history. When we are historical we are neither a great nor a small distance from what is Greek. Rather, we are in errancy toward it.

As it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws.

Being thereby holds to its truth and keeps to itself. This keeping to itself is the way it reveals itself early on. Its early sign is Ἀ–λήθεια. As it provides the unconcealment of beings it founds the concealment of Being. Concealment remains characteristic of that denial by which it keeps to itself.

We may call this luminous keeping to itself in the truth of its essence the ἐποχή of Being. However, this word, borrowed from the Stoic philosophers, does not here have the Husserlian sense of objectification or methodical exclusion by an act of thetic consciousness. The

epoche of Being belongs to Being itself; we are thinking it in terms of the experience of the oblivion of Being.

From the *epoche* of Being comes the epochal essence of its destining, in which world history properly consists. When Being keeps to itself in its destining, world suddenly and unexpectedly comes to pass. Every epoch of world history is an epoch of errancy. The epochal nature of Being belongs to the concealed temporal character of Being and designates the essence of time as thought in Being. What is represented in this word "time" is only the vacuity of an illusory time derived from beings conceived as objects.

For us, however, the most readily experienced correspondence to the epochal character of Being is the ecstatic character of *Da-sein*. The epochal essence of Being lays claim to the ecstatic nature of *Da-sein*. The *ek-sistence* of man sustains what is ecstatic and so preserves what is epochal in Being, to whose essence the *Da*, and thereby *Da-sein*, belongs.

The beginning of the epoch of Being lies in that which we call "Greek," thought epochally. This beginning, also to be thought epochally, is the dawn of the destiny in Being from Being.

Little depends on what we represent and portray of the past; but much depends on the way we are mindful of what is destined. Can we ever be mindful without thinking? But if thinking does occur we abandon all claims of shortsighted opinion and open ourselves to the claim of destiny. Does this claim speak in the early saying of Anaximander?

We are not sure whether its claim speaks to our essential being. It remains to ask whether in our relation to the truth of Being the glance of Being, and this means lightning (Heraclitus, fr. 64), strikes; or whether in our knowledge of the past only the faintest glimmers of a storm long flown cast a pale semblance of light.

Does the fragment speak to us of ὄντα in their Being? Do we apprehend what it says, the εἶναι of beings? Does a streak of light still pierce the misty confusion of errancy and tell us what ὄντα and εἶναι say in Greek? Only in the brilliance of this lightning streak can we translate ourselves to what is said in the fragment, so as to translate it in thoughtful conversation. Perhaps the confusion surrounding the use of the words ὄντα and εἶναι, "being" and "to be," comes less from the

fact that language cannot say everything adequately than because we cannot think through the matter involved clearly enough. Lessing once said, "Language can express everything we can clearly think." So it rests with us to be ready for the right opportunity, which will permit us to think clearly the matter the fragment brings to language.

We are inclined to see the opportunity we are looking for in the Anaximander fragment itself. In that case we still are not paying sufficient heed to what the way of translating requires.

For before interpreting the fragment—and not with its help to begin with—it is essential that we translate ourselves to the source of what comes to language in it, which is to say, to τὰ ὄντα. This word indicates the source from which the fragment speaks, not merely that which it expresses. That from which it speaks is already, before any expression, what is spoken by the Greek language in common everyday parlance as well as in its learned employ. We must therefore seek the opportunity which will let us cross over to that source first of all outside the fragment itself; it must be an opportunity which will let us experience what τὰ ὄντα, thought in Greek, says. Furthermore, we must at first remain outside the fragment because we have not yet delineated each of its terms; this delineation is ultimately (or, in terms of the matter itself, in the first place) governed by the knowledge of what in early times was thought or thinkable in such a choice of words, as distinct from what the prevailing notions of recent times find in it.

The text cited and translated above from Simplicius' commentary on the *Physics* is traditionally accepted as the Anaximander fragment. However, the commentary does not cite the fragment so clearly that we can ascertain with certainty where Anaximander's saying begins and where it ends. Still, our contemporaries who are exceptionally knowledgeable in the Greek language accept the text of the fragment in the form introduced at the outset of our inquiry.

But even John Burnet, the distinguished scholar of Greek philosophy to whom we owe the Oxford edition of Plato, in his book *Early Greek Philosophy* expressed doubts as to whether Simplicius' citation begins where it is usually said to begin. In opposition to Diels, Burnet writes: "Diels (*Vors.* 2, 9) begins the actual quotation with the words ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσις. . . . The Greek practice of blending quota-

tions with the text tells against this. [Only seldom does a Greek author immediately begin with a literal quotation.] Further it is safer not to ascribe the terms γένεσις and φθορά in their technical Platonic sense to Anaximander [and it is not likely that Anaximander said anything about τὰ ὄντα]."*

On this basis Burnet argues that Anaximander's saying begins only with the words κατὰ τὸ χρεών. What Burnet says in general about Greek citations speaks for the exclusion of the words preceding these. On the other hand his remarks, which rest on the terminological employment of the words γένεσις and φθορά, cannot be accepted as they stand. It is correct to say that γένεσις and φθορά become conceptual terms with Plato and Aristotle and their schools. But γένεσις and φθορά are old words which even Homer knows. Anaximander need not have employed them as conceptual terms. He cannot have applied them in this fashion, because conceptual language necessarily remains foreign to him. For conceptual language is first possible on the basis of the interpretation of Being as ἰδέα, and indeed from then on it is unavoidable.

Nevertheless, the entire sentence preceding the κατὰ τὸ χρεών is much more Aristotelian in structure and tone than archaic. The κατὰ τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν at the end of the normally accepted text also betrays the same characteristic lateness. Whoever takes it upon himself to strike out the part of the text which is dubious to Burnet cannot maintain the usually accepted closing of the fragment either. Of Anaximander's original words, only these would remain:

κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας.

. . . according to necessity; for they pay one another recompense and penalty for their injustice.

*Heidegger cites the German translation of Burnet's third edition by Else Schenkl, *Die Anfänge der griechischen Philosophie* (Berlin: Teubner, 1913), p. 43, n. 4. I have cited the fourth English edition (London: Black, 1930), p. 52, n. 6, said to be "a reprint of the third edition" with "additional references and one correction." The first bracketed phrase does not occur in the English but appears in Schenkl's translation; the second does occur in the English but not in the German. Nevertheless, the first is a natural expansion of Burnet's view; as for the second, one might expect that Heidegger's response to Burnet regarding τὰ ὄντα would duplicate that respecting γένεσις and φθορά: although not yet a technical term, τὰ ὄντα is an old word, known already by Homer in the form τ' ἐόντα, as the *Iliad* passage below (p. 33) attests.—Tr.

Now these are precisely the words in reference to which Theophrastus complains that Anaximander speaks in a rather poetic manner. Since thinking through this entire question, which came up often in my lecture courses a few years ago, I am inclined to accept only these as the immediate, genuine words of Anaximander, with the proviso however that the preceding parts of the text are not simply set aside, but rather are positively retained, on the basis of the strength and eloquence of their thought, as secondary testimony concerning Anaximander's thinking. This demands that we understand precisely these words γένεσις and φθορά as they are thought in Greek, whether they be preconceptual words or Platonic-Aristotelian conceptual terms.

Accordingly, γένεσις does not at all mean the genetic in the sense of the "developmental" as conceived in modern times; nor does φθορά mean the counterphenomenon to development—some sort of regression, shrinkage, or wasting away. Rather, γένεσις and φθορά are to be thought from φύσις, and within it, as ways of luminous rising and decline. Certainly we can translate γένεσις as origination; but we must think this originating as a movement which lets every emerging being abandon concealment and go forward into unconcealment. Certainly we can translate φθορά as passing away; but we must think this passing away as a going which in its turn abandons unconcealment, departing and withdrawing into concealment.

Presumably, Anaximander spoke of γένεσις and φθορά. It remains questionable whether this occurred in the form of the traditional statement, although such paradoxical turns of speech as γένεσις ἔστιν (which is the way I should like to read it) and φθορά γίνεται, "coming-to-be *is*," and "passing-away comes to be" still may speak in favor of an ancient language. Γένεσις is coming forward and arriving in unconcealment. Φθορά means the departure and descent into concealment of what has arrived there out of unconcealment. The coming forward into . . . and the departure to . . . *become present* within unconcealment between what is concealed and what is unconcealed. They initiate the arrival and departure of whatever has arrived.

Anaximander must have spoken of what is designated in γένεσις and φθορά: whether he actually mentioned τὰ ὄντα remains an open

question, although nothing speaks against it. The αὐτά in the second clause, because of the scope of what it says and also because of the reference of this second clause back to the κατὰ τὸ χρεών, can designate nothing less than being-in-totality experienced in a preconceptual way, τὰ πολλά, τὰ πάντα, "beings." We are still calling τὰ ὄντα "beings" without ever having clarified what ὄν and εἶναι indicate when thought in Greek. Yet we have in the meantime won a more open field in which to pursue such clarification.

We began with the usually accepted text of the fragment. In a preliminary review of it we excluded the common presuppositions which determine its interpretation. In so doing we discovered a clue in what comes to language in γένεσις and φθορά. The fragment speaks of that which, as it approaches, arrives in unconcealment, and which, having arrived here, departs by withdrawing into the distance.

However, whatever has its essence in such arrival and departure we would like to call becoming and perishing, which is to say, transiency rather than being; because we have for a long time been accustomed to set Being opposite Becoming, as if Becoming were a kind of nothingness and did not even belong to Being; and this because Being has for a long time been understood to be nothing else than sheer perdurance. Nevertheless, if Becoming *is*, then we must think Being so essentially that it does not simply include Becoming in some vacuous conceptual manner, but rather in such a way that Being sustains and characterizes Becoming (γένεσις-φθορά) in an essential, appropriate manner.

In this regard we are not to discuss whether and with what right we should represent Becoming as transiency. Rather, we must discuss what sort of essence the Greeks think for Being when in the realm of the ὄντα they experience approach and withdrawal as the basic trait of advent.

When the Greeks say τὰ ὄντα, what comes to the fore in their language? Where is there, aside from the Anaximander fragment, a guideline which would translate us there? Because the word in question, with all its modifications, ἔστιν, ἦν, ἔσται, εἶναι, speaks everywhere throughout the language—and even before thinking actually chooses this as its fundamental word—it is necessary that we avail

ourselves of an opportunity which in terms of its subject matter, its time, and the realm to which it belongs, lies outside philosophy, and which from every point of view precedes the pronouncements of thinking.

In Homer we perceive such an opportunity. Thanks to him we possess a reference in which the word appears as something more than a term in the lexicon. Rather, it is a reference which poetically brings to language what ὄντα names. Because all λέξις of the lexicographic sort presupposes the thought of the λεγόμενον, we will refrain from the futile practice of heaping up references to serve as evidence; this kind of annotation usually proves only that none of the references has been thought through. With the aid of this commonly adopted method one usually expects that by shoving together one unclarified reference with another every bit as unclear clarity will suddenly result.

The passage upon which we wish to comment is found at the beginning of the first book of the *Iliad,* lines 68-72. It gives us the chance to cross over to what the Greeks designate with the word ὄντα, provided we let ourselves be transported by the poet to the distant shore of the matter spoken there.

For the following reference a preliminary observation concerning the history of the language is needed. Our observations cannot claim to present this philological problem adequately, much less to solve it. In Plato and Aristotle we encounter the words ὄν and ὄντα as conceptual terms. The later terms "ontic" and "ontological" are formed from them. However, ὄν and ὄντα, considered linguistically, are presumably somewhat truncated forms of the original words ἐόν and ἐόντα. Only in the latter words is the sound preserved which relates them to ἔστιν and εἶναι. The epsilon in ἐόν and ἐόντα is the epsilon in the root ἐσ of ἔστιν, *est, esse,* and "is." In contrast ὄν and ὄντα appear as rootless participial endings, as though by themselves they expressly designated what we must think in those word-forms called by later grammarians μετοχή, *participium,* i.e. those word-forms which participate in the verbal and nominal senses of a word.

Thus ὄν says "being" in the sense of *to be* a being; at the same time it names a *being* which is. In the duality of the participial significance of ὄν the distinction between "to be" and "a being" lies con-

cealed. What is here set forth, which at first may be taken for grammatical hair-splitting, is in truth the riddle of Being. The participle ὄν is the word for what comes to appear in metaphysics as transcendental and transcendent Transcendence.

Archaic language, and thus Parmenides and Heraclitus as well, always employ ἐόν and ἐόντα.

But ἐόν, "being," is not only the singular form of the participle ἐόντα, "beings"; rather, it indicates what is singular as such, what is singular in its numerical unity and what is singularly and unifyingly one before all number.

We might assert in an exaggerated way, which nevertheless bears on the truth, that the fate of the West hangs on the translation of the word ἐόν, assuming that the translation consists in *crossing over* to the truth of what comes to language in ἐόν.

What does Homer tell us about this word? We are familiar with the situation of the Achaeans before Troy at the outset of the *Iliad.* For nine days the plague sent by Apollo has raged in the Greek camp. At an assembly of the warriors Achilles commands Kalchas the seer to interpret the wrath of the god.

> . . . τοῖσι δ' ἀνέστη
> Κάλχας Θεστορίδης οἰωνοπόλων ὄχ' ἄριστος
> ὅς ἤδη τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα
> καὶ νήεσσ' ἡγήσατ' Ἀχαιῶν Ἴλιον εἴσω
> ἣν διὰ μαντοσύνην, τήν οἱ πόρε Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων·
>
> . . . and among them stood up
> Kalchas, Thestor's son, far the best of the bird interpreters,
> who knew all that is, is to be, or once was,
> who guided into the land of Ilion the ships of the Achaeans
> through that seercraft of his own that Phoibos Apollo gave him.*

Before he lets Kalchas speak, Homer designates him as the seer. Whoever belongs in the realm of seers is such a one ὅς ἤδη . . . "who knew . . ."; ἤδη is the pluperfect of the perfect οἶδεν, "he has seen."

*Homer, *The Iliad,* trans. Richmond Lattimore (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961), p. 61, with minor changes. Heidegger uses the German translation by Voss.—Tr.

Only when a man has seen does he truly see. To see is to have seen. What is seen has arrived and remains for him in sight. A seer has always already seen. Having seen in advance he sees into the future. He sees the future tense out of the perfect. When the poet speaks of the seer's seeing as a having-seen, he must say what the seer has seen in the pluperfect tense, ἤδη, he had seen. What is it that the seer has seen in advance? Obviously, only what becomes present in the lighting that penetrates his sight. What is seen in such a seeing can only be what comes to presence in unconcealment. But what becomes present? The poet names something threefold; τά τ'ἐόντα, that which is in being, τά τ' ἐσσόμενα, also that which will be, πρό τ' ἐοντα, and also the being that once was.

The first point we gather from this poetic phrase is that τὰ ἐόντα is distinguished from τὰ ἐσσόμενα and πρὸ ἐόντα. Thus τὰ ἐόντα designates being in the sense of the present [*Gegenwärtigen*]. When we moderns speak of "the present," we either mean what is "now"—which we represent as something within time, the "now" serving as a phase in the stream of time—or we bring the "present" into relation with the "objective" [*Gegenständigen*]. As something objective, an object is related to a representing subject. However, if we employ "present" for the sake of a closer determination of ἐόντα, then we must understand "the present" from the essence of ἐόντα and not vice versa. Yet ἐόντα is also what is past and what is to come. Both are ways of presencing, i.e. the presencing of what is not presently present. The Greeks also named more precisely what is presently present τὰ παρεόντα, παρά meaning "alongside," in the sense of coming alongside in unconcealment. The *gegen* in *gegenwärtig* [presently] does not mean something over against a subject, but rather an open expanse [*Gegend*] of unconcealment, into which and within which whatever comes along lingers. Accordingly, as a characteristic of ἐόντα, "presently" means as much as "having arrived to linger awhile in the expanse of unconcealment." Spoken first, and thus emphasized, ἐόντα, which is expressly distinguished from προεόντα and ἐσσόμενα, names for the Greeks what is present insofar as it has arrived in the designated sense, to linger within the expanse of unconcealment. Such a coming is proper arrival, the presencing of what is properly present. What is past

and what is to come also become present, namely as outside the expanse of unconcealment. What presents itself as non-present is what is absent. As such it remains essentially related to what is presently present, inasmuch as it either comes forward into the expanse of unconcealment or withdraws from it. Even what is absent is something present, for *as* absent from the expanse, it presents itself in unconcealment. What is past and what is to come are also ἐόντα. Consequently ἐόν means becoming present in unconcealment.

The conclusion of this commentary on ἐόντα is that also in Greek experience what comes to presence remains ambiguous, and indeed necessarily so. On the one hand, τὰ ἐόντα means what is presently present; on the other, it also means all that becomes present, whether at the present time or not. However, we must never represent what is present in the broader sense as the "universal concept" of presence as opposed to a particular case—the presently present—though this is what the usual conceptual mode of thought suggests. For in fact it is precisely the presently present and the unconcealment that rules in it that pervade the essence of what is absent, as that which is not presently present.

The seer stands in sight of what is present, in its unconcealment, which has at the same time cast light on the concealment of what is absent as being absent. The seer sees inasmuch as he has seen everything as present; καί, and only on that account, νῆεσσ' ἤγησατ', was he able to lead the Achaeans' ships to Troy. He was able to do this through God-given μαντοσύνη. The seer, ὁ μάντις, is the μαινόμενος, the madman. But in what does the essence of madness consist? A madman is beside himself, outside himself: he is away. We ask: away? Where to and where from? Away from the sheer oppression of what lies before us, which is only presently present, away to what is absent; and at the same time away to what is presently present insofar as this is always only something that arrives in the course of its coming and going. The seer is outside himself in the solitary region of the presencing of everything that in some way becomes present. Therefore he can find his way back from the "away" of this region, and arrive at what has just presented itself, namely, the raging epidemic. The madness of the seer's being away does not require that he rave, roll his eyes, and toss his

limbs; the simple tranquility of bodily composure may accompany the madness of vision.

All things present and absent are gathered and preserved in *one* presencing for the seer. The old German word *war* [was] means protection. We still recognize this in *wahrnehmen* [to perceive], i.e. to take into preservation; in *gewahren* and *verwahren* [to be aware of, to keep or preserve]. We must think of *wahren* as a securing which clears and gathers. Presencing preserves [*wahrt*] in unconcealment what is present both at the present time and not at the present time. The seer speaks from the preserve [*Wahr*] of what is present. He is the soothsayer [*Wahr-Sager*].

Here we think of the preserve in the sense of that gathering which clears and shelters; it suggests itself as a long-hidden fundamental trait of presencing, i.e. of Being. One day we shall learn to think our exhausted word for truth [*Wahrheit*] in terms of the preserve; to experience truth as the preservation [*Wahrnis*] of Being; and to understand that, as presencing, Being belongs to this preservation. As protection of Being, preservation belongs to the herdsman, who has so little to do with bucolic idylls and Nature mysticism that he can be the herdsman of Being only if he continues to hold the place of nothingness. Both are the Same. Man can do both only within the openedness of *Da-sein*.

The seer is the one who has already seen the totality of what is present in its presencing. Said in Latin, *vidit;* in German, *er steht im Wissen* [he stands in knowledge]. To have seen is the essence of knowing. In "to have seen" there is always something more at play than the completion of an optical process. In it the connection with what is present subsists behind every kind of sensuous or nonsensuous grasping. On that account, "to have seen" is related to self-illuminating presencing. Seeing is determined, not by the eye, but by the lighting of Being. Presence within the lighting articulates all the human senses. The essence of seeing, as "to have seen," is to know. Knowledge embraces vision and remains indebted to presencing. Knowledge is remembrance of Being. That is why Μνημοσύνη is mother of the muses. Knowledge is not science in the modern sense. Knowledge is thoughtful maintenance of Being's preserve.

Whither have Homer's words translated us? Τὸ ἐόντα. The

Greeks experience beings as being present, whether at the present time or not, presencing in unconcealment. The word by which we translate ὄν, "being," is now no longer obtuse; no longer are "to be," as the translation of εἶναι, and the Greek word itself hastily employed ciphers for arbitrary and vague notions about some indeterminate universal.

At the same time it becomes manifest that Being, as the presencing of what is present, is already in itself truth, provided we think the essence of truth as the gathering that clears and shelters; provided we dissociate ourselves from the modern prejudice of metaphysics—today accepted as something obvious—that truth is a property of beings or of Being. Being, saying the word thoughtfully now, is εἶναι as presencing. In a hidden way it is a property of truth, but clearly not of truth considered as a characteristic of human or divine cognition, and not as a property in the sense of a quality. Furthermore, it has become clear that τὰ ἐόντα ambiguously names what is presently present and also what is not presently present; the latter, understood with regard to the former, means what is absent. But what is at the present time present is not a slice of something sandwiched between two absences. If what is present stands in the forefront of vision, everything presences together: one brings the other with it, one lets the other go. What is presently present in unconcealment lingers in unconcealment as in an open expanse. Whatever lingers (or whiles) in the expanse proceeds to it from concealment and arrives in unconcealment. But what is present *is* arriving or lingering insofar as it is also already departing from unconcealment toward concealment. What is presently present lingers awhile. It endures in approach and withdrawal. Lingering is the transition from coming to going: what is present is what in each case lingers. Lingering in transition, it lingers still in approach and lingers already in departure. What is for the time being present, what presently is, comes to presence out of absence. This must be said precisely of whatever is truly present, although our usual way of representing things would like to exclude from what is present all absence.

Τὰ ἐόντα names the unique manifold of whatever lingers awhile. Everything present in unconcealment in this way presents itself to all others, each after its own fashion.

Finally, we gather something else from the passage in Homer: τὰ

ἐόντα, so-called beings, does not mean exclusively the things of nature. In the present instance the poet applies ἐόντα to the Achaeans' encampment before Troy, the god's wrath, the plague's fury, funeral pyres, the perplexity of the leaders, and so on. In Homer's language τὰ ἐόντα is not a conceptual philosophical term but a thoughtful and thoughtfully uttered word. It does not specify natural things, nor does it at all indicate objects which stand over against human representation. Man too belongs to ἐόντα; he is that present being which, illuminating, apprehending, and thus gathering, lets what is present as such become present in unconcealment. If in the poetic designation of Kalchas what is present is thought in relation to the seer's seeing, this means for Greek thinking that the seer, as the one who has seen, is himself one who makes-present and belongs in an exceptional sense to the totality of what is present. On the other hand, it does not mean that what is present is nothing but an object wholly dependent upon the seer's subjectivity.

Τὰ ἐόντα, what is present, whether or not at the present time, is the unobtrusive name of what expressly comes to language in the Anaximander fragment. This word names that which, while not yet spoken, is the unspoken in thinking which addresses all thinking. This word names that which from now on, whether or not it is uttered, lays a claim on all Western thinking.

But only several decades later, not with Anaximander but with Parmenides, ἐόν (presencing) and εἶναι (to presence) are expressed as the fundamental words of Western thinking. This does not happen, as the normal misconception still insists, because Parmenides interprets being "logically" in terms of a proposition's structure and its copula. In the history of Greek thinking even Aristotle did not go so far when he thought the Being of beings in terms of κατηγορία. Aristotle perceived beings as what already lies before any proposition, which is to say, as what is present and lingers awhile in unconcealment. Aristotle did not have to interpret substance, ὑποκείμενον, on the basis of the subject of a predicate phrase, because the essence of substance, οὐσία, in the sense of παρουσία, was already granted. Nor did Aristotle think the presence of what is present in terms of the objectivity of an object in a proposition, but rather as ἐνέργεια, which however is far removed—as

by an abyss—from the *actualitas* of *actus purus* in medieval scholasticism.

In any case, Parmenides' ἔστιν does not mean the "is" which is the copula of a proposition. It names ἐόν, the presencing of what is present. The ἔστιν corresponds to the pure claim of Being, before the division into a first and second οὐσία, into *existentia* and *essentia*. But in this way, ἐόν is thought from the concealed and undisclosed richness of unconcealment in ἐόντα known to the early Greeks, without it ever becoming possible or necessary for them to experience in all its perspectives this essential richness itself.

From a thoughtful experience of the ἐόν of ἐόντα, spoken in a preconceptual way, the fundamental words for early thinking are uttered: Φύσις and Λόγος, Μοῖρα and Ἔρις, Ἀλήθεια and Ἕν. By means of the Ἕν, which is to be thought back into the realm of fundamental words, ἐόν and εἶναι become the words which expressly indicate what is present. Only as a result of the destiny of Being, as the destiny of Ἕν, does the modern age after essential upheavals enter the epoch of the monadology of substance, which completes itself in the phenomenology of spirit.

It is not that Parmenides interpreted Being logically. On the contrary, having sprung from metaphysics, which at the same time it wholly dominated, logic led to a state of affairs where the essential richness of Being hidden in these early fundamental words remained buried. Thus Being could be driven to the fatal extreme of serving as the emptiest, most universal concept.

But since the dawn of thinking "Being" names the presencing of what is present, in the sense of the gathering which clears and shelters, which in turn is thought and designated as the Λόγος. The Λόγος (λέγειν, to gather or assemble) is experienced through Ἀλήθεια, the sheltering which reveals things. In the bifurcated essense of Ἀλήθεια, what is essentially thought as Ἔρις and Μοῖρα, which at the same time mean Φύσις, lies concealed.

In the language of these fundamental words, thought from the experience of presencing, these words from the Anaximander fragment resound: δίκη, τίσις, ἀδικία.

The claim of Being which speaks in these words determines

philosophy in its essence. Philosophy did not spring from myth. It arises solely from thinking and in thinking. But thinking is the thinking of Being. Thinking does not originate: it is, when Being presences. But the collapse of thinking into the sciences and into faith is the baneful destiny of Being.

In the dawn of Being's destiny, beings, τὰ ἐόντα, come to language. From the restrained abundance of what in this way comes, what does the Anaximander fragment bring to utterance? According to the presumably genuine text, the fragment reads:

. . . κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας.

In the standard translation:

. . . according to necessity; for they pay one another recompense and penalty for their injustice.

The fragment still consists of two clauses; of the first one only the closing words are retained. We will begin by commenting on the second clause.

The αὐτά refers to what is named in the previous clause. The antecedent can only be τὰ ὄντα, the totality of what is present, whatever is present in unconcealment, whether or not at the present time. Whether or not this is expressly designated by the word ἐόντα may remain an open question since the text is uncertain. The αὐτά refers to everything present, everything that presences by lingering awhile: gods and men, temples and cities, sea and land, eagle and snake, tree and shrub, wind and light, stone and sand, day and night. What is present coheres in unifying presencing, as everything becomes present to everything else within its duration; it becomes present and lingers with the others. This multiplicity (πολλά) is not a muster of separate objects behind which something stands, embracing them as a whole. Rather, presencing as such is ruled by the lingering-with-one-another of a concealed gathering. Thus Heraclitus, catching sight of this essential gathering, unifying, and revealing in presencing, named the Ἕν (the Being of beings) the Λόγος.

But before this, how does Anaximander experience the totality of things present; how does he experience their having arrived to linger

awhile among one another in unconcealment? What at bottom runs through whatever is present? The fragment's last word gives the answer. We must begin the translation with it. This word designates the basic trait of what is present: ἡ ἀδικία. The literal translation is "injustice." But is this literal translation faithful? That is to say: does the word which translates ἀδικία heed what comes to language in the saying? Does the αὐτά, the totality of what is present, lingering awhile in unconcealment, stand before our eyes?

How is what lingers awhile in presence unjust? What is unjust about it? Is it not the right of whatever is present that in each case it linger awhile, endure, and so fulfill its presencing?

The word ἀ–δικία immediately suggests that δίκη is absent. We are accustomed to translate δίκη as "right." The translations even use "penalties" to translate "right." If we resist our own juridical-moral notions, if we restrict ourselves to what comes to language, then we hear that wherever ἀδικία rules all is not right with things. That means, something is out of joint. But of what are we speaking? Of what is present, lingering awhile. But where are there jointures in what is present? Or where is there even one jointure? How can what is present without jointure be ἄδικον, out of joint?

The fragment clearly says that what is present is in ἀδικία, i.e. is out of joint. However, that cannot mean that things no longer come to presence. But neither does it say that what is present is only occasionally, or perhaps only with respect to some one of its properties, out of joint. The fragment says: what is present as such, being what it is, is out of joint. To presencing as such jointure must belong, thus creating the possibility of its being out of joint. What is present is that which lingers awhile. The while occurs essentially as the transitional arrival in departure: the while comes to presence between approach and withdrawal. Between this twofold absence the presencing of all that lingers occurs. In this "between" whatever lingers awhile is joined. This "between" is the jointure in accordance with which whatever lingers is joined, from its emergence here to its departure away from here. The presencing of whatever lingers obtrudes into the "here" of its coming, as into the "away" of its going. In both directions presencing is conjointly disposed toward absence. Presencing comes about in such a jointure. What is

present emerges by approaching and passes away by departing; it does both at the same time, indeed because it lingers. The "while" occurs essentially in the jointure.

But then what lingers awhile is precisely in the jointure of its presencing, and not at all, as we might put it, in disjunction, ἀδικία. But the fragment says it is. The fragment speaks from the essential experience that ἀδικία is the fundamental trait of ἐόντα.

Whatever lingers awhile becomes present as it lingers in the jointure which arranges presencing jointly between a twofold absence. Still, as what is present, whatever lingers awhile—and only it—can stay the length of its while. What has arrived may even insist upon its while solely to remain more present, in the sense of perduring. That which lingers perseveres in its presencing. In this way it extricates itself from its transitory while. It strikes the willful pose of persistence, no longer concerning itself with whatever else is present. It stiffens—as if this were the way to linger—and aims solely for continuance and subsistence.

Coming to presence in the jointure of the while, what is present abandons that jointure and is, in terms of whatever lingers awhile, in disjunction. Everything that lingers awhile stands in disjunction. To the presencing of what is present, to the ἐόν of ἐόντα, ἀδικία belongs. Thus, standing in disjunction would be the essence of all that is present. And so in this early fragment of thinking the pessimism—not to say the nihilism—of the Greek experience of Being would come to the fore.

However, does the fragment say that the essence of what is present consists in disjunction? It does and it doesn't. Certainly, the fragment designates disjunction as the fundamental trait of what is present, but only to say:

διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην . . . τῆς ἀδικίας.

"They must pay penalty," Nietzsche translates; "They pay recompense," Diels translates, "for their injustice." But the fragment says nothing about payment, recompense, and penalty; nor does it say that something is punishable, or even must be avenged, according to the opinion of those who equate justice with vengeance.

Meanwhile, the thoughtlessly uttered "injustice of things" has been clarified by thinking the essence of what lingers awhile in presence as the disjunction in lingering. The disjunction consists in the fact that whatever lingers awhile seeks to win for itself a while based solely on the model of continuance. Lingering as persisting, considered with respect to the jointure of the while, is an insurrection on behalf of sheer endurance. Continuance asserts itself in presencing as such, which lets each present being linger awhile in the expanse of unconcealment. In this rebellious whiling whatever lingers awhile insists upon sheer continuance. What is present then comes to presence without, and in opposition to, the jointure of the while. The fragment does not say that whatever is present for the time being loses itself in disjunction; it says that whatever lingers awhile with a view to disjunction διδόναι δίκην, gives jointure.

What does "give" mean here? How should whatever lingers awhile, whatever comes to presence in disjunction, be able to give jointure? Can it give what it doesn't have? If it gives anything at all, doesn't it give jointure away? Where and how does that which is present for the time being give jointure? We must ask our question more clearly, by questioning from within the matter.

How should what is present as such give the jointure of its presencing? The giving designated here can only consist in its manner of presencing. Giving is not only giving-away; originally, giving has the sense of acceding or giving-to. Such giving lets something belong to another which properly belongs to him. What belongs to that which is present is the jointure of its while, which it articulates in its approach and withdrawal. In the jointure whatever lingers awhile keeps to its while. It does not incline toward the disjunction of sheer persistence. The jointure belongs to whatever lingers awhile, which in turn belongs in the jointure. The jointure is order.

Δίκη, thought on the basis of Being as presencing, is the ordering and enjoining Order. 'Αδικία, disjunction, is Disorder. Now it is only necessary that we think this capitalized word capitally—in its full linguistic power.

Whatever lingers awhile in presence comes to presence insofar as it lingers; all the while, emerging and passing away, and the jointure of

the transition from approach to withdrawal, continue. This lingering endurance of the transition is the enjoined continuance of what is present. The enjoined continuance does not at all insist upon sheer persistence. It does not fall into disjunction; it surmounts disorder. Lingering the length of its while, whatever lingers awhile lets its essence as presencing belong to order. The διδόναι designates this "letting belong to."

The presencing of whatever is present for the time being does not consist in ἀδικία by itself, i.e. not in disorder alone; rather, it consists in διδόναι δίκην . . . τῆς ἀδικίας, since whatever is present lets order belong in each case. Whatever is presently present is not a slice of something shoved in between what is not presently present; it is present insofar as it lets itself belong to the non-present:

διδόναι . . . αὐτὰ δίκην . . . τῆς ἀδικίας,

—they, these same beings, let order belong (by the surmounting) of disorder.

The experience of beings in their Being which here comes to language is neither pessimistic nor nihilistic; nor is it optimistic. It is tragic. That is a presumptuous thing to say. However, we discover a trace of the essence of tragedy, not when we explain it psychologically or aesthetically, but rather only when we consider its essential form, the Being of beings, by thinking the διδόναι δίκην . . . τῆς ἀδικίας.

Whatever lingers awhile in presence, τὰ ἐόντα, becomes present when it lets enjoining order belong. To what does the order of jointure belong, and where does it belong? When and in what way does that which lingers awhile in presence give order? The fragment does not directly say anything about this, at least to the extent we have so far considered it. If we turn our attention to the still untranslated portion, however, it seems to say clearly to whom or what the διδόναι is directed:

διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις

—present beings which linger awhile let order belong ἀλλήλοις, to one

another. Thus we are generally accustomed to read the text; we relate the ἀλλήλοις to δίκην and τίσιν, if we represent it clearly and expressly name it, as does Diels—though Nietzsche passes over it entirely in his translation. However, it seems to me that the immediate relation of ἀλλήλοις to διδόναι δίκην is neither linguistically necessary nor, more important, justified by the matter itself. Therefore it remains for us to ask, from within the matter itself, whether ἀλλήλοις should be directly related also to δίκην, or whether it should not indeed rather be related only to the τίσιν which immediately precedes it. The decision in this case depends in part on how we translate the καί that stands between δίκην and τίσιν. But this is determined by what τίσις here says.

We usually translate τίσις by "penalty." This leads us to translate διδόναι as "to pay." Whatever lingers awhile in presence pays penalty; it expends this as its punishment (δίκη). The court of justice is complete. It lacks nothing, not even injustice—though of course no one rightly knows what might constitute injustice.

Surely, τίσις can mean penalty, but it must not, because the original and essential significance of the word is not thereby named. For τίσις is "esteem" [*Schätzen*]. To esteem something means to heed it, and so to take satisfactory care of what is estimable in it. The essential process of esteem, which is to satisfy, can, in what is good, be a magnamimous action; but with respect to wickedness giving satisfaction may mean paying a penalty. Yet a mere commentary on the word does not bring us to the matter in the fragment's use of the word if we have not already, as with ἀδικία and δίκη, thought from within the matter which comes to language in the fragment.

According to the fragment the αὐτά (τὰ ἐόντα), those beings that linger awhile in presence, stand in disorder. As they linger awhile, they tarry. They hang on. For they advance hesitantly through their while, in transition from arrival to departure. They hang on; they cling to themselves. When what lingers awhile delays, it stubbornly follows the inclination to persist in hanging on, and indeed to insist on persisting; it aims at everlasting continuance and no longer bothers about δίκη, the order of the while.

But in this way everything that lingers awhile strikes a haughty

pose toward every other of its kind. None heeds the lingering presence of the others. Whatever lingers awhile is inconsiderate toward others, each dominated by what is implied in its lingering presence, namely, the craving to persist. Beings which linger awhile do not in this respect simply drift into inconsiderateness. Inconsiderateness impels them toward persistence, so that they may still present themselves as what is present. Nevertheless, what is present in totality does not simply disintegrate into inconsiderate individualities; it does not dissipate itself in discontinuity. Rather, the saying now says:

διδόναι . . . τίσιν ἀλλήλοις

—beings which linger awhile let belong, one to the other: consideration with regard to one another. The translation of τίσις as consideration coincides better with the essential meaning of "heeding" and "esteeming." It is thought from within the matter, on the basis of the presencing of what lingers awhile. But the word "consideration" means for us too directly that human trait, while τίσις is applied neutrally, because more essentially, to everything present, αὐτά (τὰ ἐόντα). Our word "consideration" lacks not only the necessary breadth, but above all the gravity to speak as the translating word for τίσις in the fragment, and as the word corresponding to δίκη, order.

Now our language possesses an old word which, interestingly enough, we moderns know only in its negative form, indeed only as a form of disparagement, as with the word *Unfug* [disorder]. This usually suggests to us something like an improper or vulgar sort of behavior, something perpetrated in a crude manner. In the same fashion, we still use the word *ruchlos* [reckless] to mean something pejorative and shameful: something without *Ruch* [reck]. We no longer really know what *Ruch* means. The Middle High German word *ruoche* means solicitude or care. Care tends to something so that it may remain in its essence. This turning-itself-toward, when thought of what lingers awhile in relation to presencing, is τίσις, reck. Our word *geruhen* [to deign or respect] is related to reck and has nothing to do with *Ruhe* [rest]: to deign means to esteem something, to let or allow something to be itself. What we observed concerning the word "consideration,"

that it has to do with human relations, is also true of *ruoche*. But we shall take advantage of the obsolescence of the word by adopting it anew in its essential breadth; we will speak of τίσις as the reck corresponding to δίκη, order.

Insofar as beings which linger awhile do not entirely dissipate themselves in the boundless conceit of aiming for a baldly insistent subsistence, insofar as they no longer share the compulsion to expel one another from what is presently present, they let order belong, διδόναι δίκην. Insofar as beings which linger awhile give order, each being thereby lets reck belong to the other, lets reck pervade its relations with the others, διδόναι . . . καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις. Only when we have already thought τὰ ἐόντα as what is present, and this as the totality of what lingers awhile, does ἀλλήλοις receive the significance thought for it in the fragment: within the open expanse of unconcealment each lingering being becomes present to every other being. So long as we do not think of the τὰ ἐόντα, the ἀλλήλοις remains a name for an indeterminate reciprocity in a chaotic manifold. The more strictly we think in ἀλλήλοις the manifold of beings lingering awhile, the clearer becomes the necessary relation of ἀλλήλοις to τίσις. The more unequivocally this relation emerges, the more clearly we recognize that the διδόναι . . . τίσιν ἀλλήλοις, each one giving reck to the other, is the sole manner in which what lingers awhile in presence lingers at all, i.e. διδόναι δίκην, granting order. The καί between δίκην and τίσιν is not simply the vacuous conjunction "and." It signifies the essential process. If what is present grants order, it happens in this manner: as beings linger awhile, they give reck to one another. The surmounting of disorder properly occurs through the letting-belong of reck. This means that the essential process of the disorder of non-reck, of the reckless, occurs in ἀδικία:

διδόναι . . . αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας

—they let order belong, and thereby also reck, to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder.

To let belong is, as the καί suggests, something twofold, since the essence of ἐόντα is dually determined. Whatever lingers awhile comes

to presence from the jointure between approach and withdrawal. It comes to presence in the "between" of a twofold absence. Whatever lingers awhile comes to presence in each case in accordance with its while. It comes to presence as what is present at the present time. With a view to its while it gives reck, and even a while, to the others. But to whom does whatever is present let the order of jointure belong?

The second clause of the fragment, which we have been interpreting, does not answer this question. But it provides a clue. For we have passed over a word: διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ . . . they (namely) let belong. . . . The γάρ, "for" or "namely," introduces a grounding. In any case, the second clause delineates the extent to which the matter of the previous clause behaves in the prescribed manner.

What does the translation of the fragment's second clause say? It says that the ἐόντα, whatever is present, as that which lingers awhile, is released into reckless disorder; and it tells how present beings surmount disorder by letting order and reck belong to one another. This letting-belong is the manner in which what lingers awhile lingers and so comes to presence as what is present. The fragment's second clause designates what is present in the manner of its presencing. The saying speaks of what is present and tells about its presencing. This it places in the brilliance of what is thought. The second clause offers a commentary on the presencing of what is present.

For this reason the first clause must designate presencing itself, and even the extent to which presencing determines what is present as such; only so can the second clause in turn, referring back to the first by means of the γάρ, comment on the presencing of what is present. Presencing, in relation to what is present, is always that in accordance with which what is present comes to presence. The first clause names that presencing "in accordance with which . . ." Only the last three words of the first clause are preserved:

. . . κατὰ τὸ χρεών·

This is translated: ". . . according to necessity;". We will leave τὸ χρεών untranslated at first. But we can still reflect on two matters

concerning τὸ χρεών which arose in our commentary on the second clause and its reference back to the first clause. First, that it designates the presencing of what is present; second, that if χρεών thinks the presencing of what is present, then presencing may be thought somehow in terms of what is present; or it may prove to be otherwise, that the relation of Being to beings can only come from Being, can only rest in the essence of Being.

The word κατά precedes τὸ χρεών. It means "down here from above," or "over here." The κατά refers back to something from which something lower comes to presence, as from something higher and as its consequent. That in reference to which the κατά is pronounced retains something that has befallen it [*Gefälle*], in accordance with which such and such is the case, both for it and for others.

But in consequence of what, or by what befalling, can what is present become present as such, if not in consequence of, or by the befalling of, presencing? That which lingers awhile in presence lingers κατὰ τὸ χρεών. No matter how we are to think τὸ χρεών, the word is the earliest name for what we have thought as the ἐόν of ἐόντα; τὸ χρεών is the oldest name in which thinking brings the Being of beings to language.

That which lingers awhile in presence becomes present as it surmounts reckless disorder, ἀδικία, which haunts lingering itself as an essential possibility. The presencing of what is present *is* such a surmounting. It is accomplished when beings which linger awhile let order belong, and thereby reck, among one another. The answer to the question to whom order belongs is now provided: order belongs to that which comes to presence by way of presencing—and that means by way of a surmounting. Order is κατὰ τὸ χρεών. At this point something of the essence of χρεών begins to glimmer, though at first from a great distance. If, as the essence of presencing, χρεών is related essentially to what is present, then τὸ χρεών must enjoin order and thereby also reck in that relation. The χρεών enjoins matters in such a way that whatever is present lets order and reck belong. The χρεών lets such enjoining prevail among present beings and so grants them the manner of their arrival—as the while of whatever lingers awhile.

What is present comes to presence when it surmounts the dis- of disorder, the ἀ- of ἀδικία. This ἀπό in ἀδικία corresponds to the κατά of χρεών. The transitional γάρ in the second clause strings the bow, connecting one end to the other.

So far we have tried to think what τὸ χρεών means only in terms of the reference of the fragment's second clause back to it, without asking about the word itself. What does τὸ χρεών mean? This first word in the fragment's text we are interpreting last because it is first with respect to the matter. What matter? The matter of the presencing of what is present. But to be the Being *of* beings is the matter of Being.

The grammatical form of this enigmatic, ambiguous genitive indicates a genesis, the emergence of what is present from presencing. Yet the essence of this emergence remains concealed along with the essence of these two words. Not only that, but even the very relation between presencing and what is present remains unthought. From early on it seems as though presencing and what is present were each something for itself. Presencing itself unnoticeably becomes something present. Represented in the manner of something present, it is elevated above whatever else is present and so becomes the highest being present. As soon as presencing is named it is represented as some present being. Ultimately, presencing as such is not distinguished from what is present: it is taken merely as the most universal or the highest of present beings, thereby becoming one among such beings. The essence of presencing, and with it the distinction between presencing and what is present, remains forgotten. *The oblivion of Being is oblivion of the distinction between Being and beings.*

However, oblivion of the distinction is by no means the consequence of a forgetfulness of thinking. Oblivion of Being belongs to the self-veiling essence of Being. It belongs so essentially to the destiny of Being that the dawn of this destiny rises as the unveiling of what is present in its presencing. This means that the history of Being begins with the oblivion of Being, since Being—together with its essence, its distinction from beings—keeps to itself. The distinction collapses. It remains forgotten. Although the two parties to the distinction, what is present and presencing, reveal themselves, they do not do so *as*

distinguished. Rather, even the early trace of the distinction is obliterated when presencing appears as something present and finds itself in the position of being the highest being present.

The oblivion of the distinction, with which the destiny of Being begins and which it will carry through to completion, is all the same not a lack, but rather the richest and most prodigious event: in it the history of the Western world comes to be borne out. It is the event of metaphysics. What now *is* stands in the shadow of the already foregone destiny of Being's oblivion.

However, the distinction between Being and beings, as something forgotten, can invade our experience only if it has already unveiled itself with the presencing of what is present; only if it has left a trace which remains preserved in the language to which Being comes. Thinking along those lines, we may surmise that the distinction has been illuminated more in that early word about Being than in recent ones; yet at no time has the distinction been designated as such. Illumination of the distinction therefore cannot mean that the distinction appears as a distinction. On the contrary, the relation to what is present in presencing as such may announce itself in such a way that presencing comes to speak *as this relation.*

The early word concerning Being, τὸ χρεών, designates such a relation. However, we would be deceiving ourselves if we thought we could locate the distinction and get behind its essence merely by etymologically dissecting the meaning of the word χρεών with enough persistence. Perhaps only when we experience historically what has not been thought—the oblivion of Being—as what is to be thought, and only when we have for the longest time pondered what we have long experienced in terms of the destiny of Being, may the early word speak in our contemporary recollection.

We are accustomed to translate the word χρεών by "necessity." By that we mean what is compelling—that which inescapably must be. Yet we err if we adhere to this derived meaning exclusively. Χρεών is derived from χράω, χράομαι. It suggests ἡ χείρ, the hand; χράω means: I get involved with something, I reach for it, extend my hand to it. At the same time χράω means to place in someone's hands or hand

over, thus to deliver, to let something belong to someone. But such delivery is of a kind which keeps this transfer in hand, and with it what is transferred.

Therefore the participial χρεών originally signifies nothing of constraint and of what "must be." Just as little does the word initially or ever mean to ratify and ordain.

If we firmly keep in mind that we must think the word within the Anaximander fragment, then it can only mean what is essential in the presencing *of* what is present, and hence that relation to which the genitive so mysteriously alludes. Τὸ χρεών is thus the handing over of presence which presencing delivers to what is present, and which thus keeps in hand, i.e. preserves in presencing, what is present as such.

The relation to what is present that rules in the essence of presencing itself is a unique one, altogether incomparable to any other relation. It belongs to the uniqueness of Being itself. Therefore, in order to name the essential nature of Being, language would have to find a single word, the unique word. From this we can gather how daring every thoughtful word addressed to Being is. Nevertheless such daring is not impossible, since Being speaks always and everywhere throughout language. The difficulty lies not so much in finding in thought the word for Being as in retaining purely in genuine thinking the word found.

Anaximander says, τὸ χρεών. We will dare a translation which sounds strange and which can be easily misinterpreted: τὸ χρεών, usage [*der Brauch*].

With this translation we ascribe to the Greek word a sense that is foreign neither to the word itself nor to the matter designated by the word in the saying. Nonetheless the translation makes excessive demands. It loses none of this character even when we consider that all translation in the field of thinking inevitably makes such demands.

To what extent is τὸ χρεών "usage"? The strangeness of the translation is reduced when we think more clearly about the word in our language. Usually we understand "to use" to mean utilizing and benefiting from what we have a right to use. What our utilizing benefits from becomes the usual. Whatever is used is in usage. "Usage," as the word that translates τὸ χρεών, should not be understood in these

current, derived senses. We should rather keep to the root-meaning: to use is to brook [*bruchen*], in Latin *frui,* in German *fruchten, Frucht.** We translate this freely as "to enjoy," which originally means to be pleased with something and so to have it in use. Only in its derived senses does "enjoy" mean simply to consume or gobble up. We encounter what we have called the basic meaning of "use," in the sense of *frui,* in Augustine's words, *Quid enim est aliud quod dicimus frui, nisi praesto habēre, quod diligis?*** *Frui* involves *praesto habēre. Praesto, praesitum* is in Greek ὑποκείμενον, that which already lies before us in unconcealment, οὐσία, that which lingers awhile in presence. "To use" accordingly suggests: to let something present come to presence as such; *frui,* to brook, to use, usage, means: to hand something over to its own essence and to keep it in hand, preserving it as something present.

In the translation of τὸ χρεών usage is thought as essential presencing in Being itself. "To brook," *frui,* is no longer merely predicated of enjoyment as a form of human behavior; nor is it said in relation to any being whatsoever, even the highest *(fruitio Dei* as the *beatitudo hominis);* rather, usage now designates the manner in which Being itself presences as the relation to what is present, approaching and becoming involved with what is present as present: τὸ χρεών.

Usage delivers what is present to its presencing, i.e. to its lingering. Usage dispenses to what is present the portion of its while. The while apportioned in each case to what lingers rests in the jointure which joins what is present in the transition between twofold absence (arrival and departure). The jointure of the while bounds and confines what is present as such. That which lingers awhile in presence, τὰ ἐόντα, comes to presence within bounds (πέρας).

*"To brook" is today used only in negative constructions—"I'll brook no rival!"—which suggest unwillingness to put up with a state of affairs. It shares its original Teutonic stem with the modern German *brauchen* and the Middle High German *brûchen: bruk-,* from the Indo-European *bhrug-.* Its archaic senses include: to make use of, to have the enjoyment of, to bear or hold, to possess the right of usufruct—i.e. the right to cultivate and use land one does not own, and to enjoy its fruits.—TR.

**"For what else do we mean when we say *frui* if not to have at hand something that is especially prized?" *De moribus ecclesiae,* lib. I, c. 3; cf. *De doctrina christiana,* lib. I, c. 2-4. For the first see *Basic Writings of Saint Augustine,* 2 vols., ed. Whitney J. Oates (New York: Random House, 1948) I, 321; for the second see *On Christian Doctrine,* trans. D. W. Robertson, Jr. (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1958), pp. 9-10.—TR.

As dispenser of portions of the jointure, usage is the fateful joining: the enjoining of order and thereby of reck. Usage distributes order and reck in such manner that it reserves for itself what is meted out, gathers it to itself, and secures it as what is present in presencing.

But usage, enjoining order and so limiting what is present, distributes boundaries. As τὸ χρεών it is therefore at the same time ἄπειρον, that which is without boundary, since its essence consists in sending boundaries of the while to whatever lingers awhile in presence.

According to the tradition recounted in Simplicius' commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, Anaximander is supposed to have said that whatever is present has its essential origin in what presences without bounds: ἀρχὴ τῶν ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον. What presences without bounds, not joined by order and reck, is not some present being but rather τὸ χρεών.

Enjoining order and reck, usage delivers to each present being the while into which it is released. But accompanying this process is the constant danger that lingering will petrify into mere persistence. Thus usage essentially remains at the same time the distribution of presencing into disorder. Usage conjoins the dis-.

Therefore, whatever lingers awhile in presence can only come to presence when it lets order and thereby also reck belong: with respect to usage. What is present comes to presence κατὰ τὸ χρεών, along the lines of usage. Usage is the enjoining and preserving gathering of what is present in its presencing, a presencing which lingers awhile according to each particular case.

The translation of τὸ χρεών as "usage" has not resulted from a preoccupation with etymologies and dictionary meanings. The choice of the word stems from a prior crossing *over* of a thinking which tries to think the distinction in the essence of Being in the fateful beginning of Being's oblivion. The word "usage" is dictated to thinking in the experience of Being's oblivion. What properly remains to be thought in the word "usage" has presumably left a trace in τὸ χρεών. This trace quickly vanishes in the destiny of Being which unfolds in world history as Western metaphysics.

The Anaximander fragment, thinking of what is present in its

presencing, elucidates what τὸ χρεών means. What is thought as χρεών in the fragment is the first and most thoughtful interpretation of what the Greeks experienced in the name Μοῖρα as the dispensing of portions. Gods and men are subordinated to Μοῖρα. Τὸ Χρεών, usage, is the handing over of what is in each case present into its while in unconcealment.

Τὸ Χρεών harbors the still hidden essence of the gathering which clears and shelters. Usage is the gathering: ὁ Λόγος. From the essence of Λόγος, thought in this way, the essence of Being is determined as the unifying One, Ἕν. Parmenides thinks this same Ἕν. He thinks the unity of this unifying One expressly as the Μοῖρα (fr. VIII, 37). Thought from within the essential experience of Being, Μοῖρα corresponds to the Λόγος of Heraclitus. The essence of Μοῖρα and Λόγος is thoughtfully intimated in the Χρεών of Anaximander.

To search for influences and dependencies among thinkers is to misunderstand thinking. Every thinker is dependent—upon the address of Being. The extent of this dependence determines the freedom from irrelevant influences. The broader the dependence the more puissant the freedom of thought, and therefore the more foreboding the danger that it may wander past what was once thought, and yet —perhaps only thus—think the Same.

Of course, in our recollecting we latecomers must first have thought about the Anaximander fragment in order to proceed to the thought of Parmenides and Heraclitus. If we have done so, then the misinterpretation that the philosophy of the former must have been a doctrine of Being while that of the latter was a doctrine of Becoming is exposed as superficial.

However, in order to think the Anaximander fragment we must first of all, but then continually, take a simple step: we must cross over to what that always unspoken word, ἐόν, ἐόντα, εἶναι says. It says: presencing into unconcealment. Concealed in that word is this: *presencing brings unconcealment along with itself.* Unconcealment itself is presencing. Both are the Same, though they are not identical.

What is present is that which, whether presently or not, presences in unconcealment. Along with the Ἀλήθεια which belongs to the essence of Being, the Λήθη remains entirely unthought, as in conse-

quence do "presently" and "non-presently," i.e. the region of the open expanse in which everything present arrives and in which the presencing to one another of beings which linger awhile is unfolded and delimited.

Because beings are what is present in the manner of that which lingers awhile, once they have arrived in unconcealment they can linger there, they can appear. Appearance is an essential consequence of presencing and of the kind of presencing involved. Only what appears can in the first place show an aspect and form, thinking these matters always from within presencing. Only a thinking which has beforehand thought Being in the sense of presencing into unconcealment can think the presencing of what is present as ἰδέα. But whatever lingers awhile in presence at the same time lingers as something brought forward into unconcealment. It is so brought when, arising by itself, it produces itself; or it is so brought when it is produced by man. In both cases what has arrived in the foreground of unconcealment is in a certain sense an ἔργον, which in Greek is thought as something brought forward. The presencing of what is present, with respect to its ἔργον character, thought in the light of presence, can be experienced as that which occurs essentially in production. This is the presencing of what is present: the Being of beings is ἐνέργεια.

The ἐνέργεια which Aristotle thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, of ἐόν, the ἰδέα which Plato thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the Λόγος which Heraclitus thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the Μοῖρα which Parmenides thinks as the fundamental character of presencing, the Χρεών which Anaximander thinks is essential in presencing—all these name the Same. In the concealed richness of the Same the unity of the unifying One, the Ἕν, is thought by each thinker in his own way.

Meanwhile an epoch of Being soon comes in which ἐνέργεια is translated as *actualitas*. The Greek is shut away, and to the present day the word appears only in Roman type. *Actualitas* becomes *Wirklichkeit* [reality]. Reality becomes objectivity [*Objektivität*]. But objectivity must still preserve the character of presencing if it is to remain in its essence, its objectivity [*Gegenständlichkeit*]. It is the "presence"

[*Präsenz*] of representational thinking. The decisive turn in the destiny of Being as ἐνέργεια lies in the transition to *actualitas*.

Could a mere translation have precipitated all this? We may yet learn what can come to pass in translation. The truly fateful encounter with historic language is a silent event. But in it the destiny of Being speaks. Into what language is the land of evening translated?

We shall now try to translate the Anaximander fragment:

. . . κατὰ τὸ χρεών· διδόναι γὰρ αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας.

. . . along the lines of usage; for they let order and thereby also reck belong to one another (in the surmounting) of disorder.

We cannot demonstrate the adequacy of the translation by scholarly means; nor should we simply accept it through faith in some authority or other. Scholarly proof will not carry us far enough, and faith has no place in thinking. We can only reflect on the translation by thinking through the saying. But thinking is the poetizing of the truth of Being in the historic dialogue between thinkers.

For this reason the fragment will never engage us so long as we only explain it historiologically and philologically. Curiously enough, the saying first resonates when we set aside the claims of our own familiar ways of representing things, as we ask ourselves in what the confusion of the contemporary world's fate consists.

Man has already begun to overwhelm the entire earth and its atmosphere, to arrogate to himself in forms of energy the concealed powers of nature, and to submit future history to the planning and ordering of a world government. This same defiant man is utterly at a loss simply to say what *is;* to say *what* this *is*—that a thing *is*.

The totality of beings is the single object of a singular will to conquer. The simplicity of Being is confounded in a singular oblivion.

What mortal can fathom the abyss of this confusion? He may try to shut his eyes before this abyss. He may entertain one delusion after another. The abyss does not vanish.

Theories of nature and doctrines of history do not dissolve the confusion. They further confuse everything until it is unrecognizable,

since they themselves feed on the confusion prevailing over the distinction between beings and Being.

Is there any rescue? Rescue comes when and only when danger *is*. Danger *is* when Being itself advances to its farthest extreme, and when the oblivion that issues from Being itself undergoes reversal.

But what if Being in its essence *needs to use* [*braucht*] the essence of man? If the essence of man consists in thinking the truth of Being?

Then thinking must poetize on the riddle of Being. It brings the dawn of thought into the neighborhood of what is for thinking.